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as a defense to a suit on the original cause of action if brought by the
creditor before breach of the accord. The court indicates approval, however,
of the common law rule that an executory accord is not a bar to a suit
on the original claim. The sounder view would seem to be that the right
to enforce the original cause of action is suspended until breach of the
contract of accord.17 This would give effect to the apparent intent of the
parties, namely, that the debtor should have the chance to give the satisfac-
tion within the specified time during which he could not be subjected to
an action on the original claim.
The decision, limited by the facts of the case, leaves unanswered the
questions: whether the original cause of action is suspended until breach
of the accord and whether, upon breach of the accord by the creditor, the
debtor can maintain an action for damages or specifically enforce the
accord. It would seem however, that since the court has now apparently
adopted the view that an executory accord is an enforceable contract, the
breaching creditor should be liable to the debtor in an action for damages.
Further, it would not be too great a step to hold that the original cause
of action is suspended until breach of the executory accord. These remedies
are provided in § 417 of the Restatement of Contracts, which also provides
that upon breach by the creditor the debtor may specifically enforce the
accord. It is suggested that when cases arise in these areas the better
course would be to follow these provisions.
JOSEPH P. WARNER
Contracts—Economic Duress.—Wolf v. Marlton Corfroration. 1—Defend-
ant housing developer contracted to build a house for the plaintiff, title to
pass on completion. A down payment of $2450 was made, with a second
payment to be made on the final enclosing of the house. Plaintiff, prior to
the time when the second payment was due, sought to terminate the contract
and proposed that the contractor keep $450 of the down payment upon can-
cellation. Upon the developer's refusal to cancel, plaintiff threatened that
if agreement was not reached on his proposition, he would, on completion
of the contract, resell the house and lot to an undesirable purchaser and
thus ruin the developer's business. Defendant took plaintiff's threats as
a breach of the contract and refused to continue. In suit for recovery of the
down payment, the trial court found for the plaintiff, and the defendant
appealed. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, remanded
for further findings of facts. If, on further hearings, it is found that the
threats were in fact made and defendant actually believed that they would
be carried out, as a result of which his will was overborne, he was justified
in treating the contract as breached and is entitled to recover whatever
damages resulted therefrom.
11 See supra note 6.
1 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154 A,2d 625 (1959).
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CASE NOTES
It is well settled that where one party to a contract makes it impossible
for the other to carry out the terms thereof, the latter may regard the
contract as breathed and recover damages. 2 It is further well settled that
a contract induced by duress will be nullified at the option of the party sub-
jected to the duress. The common law concept of duress, which required an
unlawful constraint in terms of threats of death, bodily harm, or imprison-
ment, has been greatly enlarged by the doctrine of economic duress or, as
it is commonly referred to, business compulsion?' Under this enlarged
concept threats of wrongful economic pressure constitute duress sufficient
to invalidate a contract at the election of the threatened party. As to the
requirement that the economic pressure be wrongful, 4 it is often said in
the cases that a threat to do only what one has a legal right to do is not
sufficient.5 However, recent cases dealing with compulsion take the position
that threatened acts technically legal, yet, wrongful in a moral or equitable
sense, are sufficient to constitute duress. 5 A further development of the busi-
ness compulsion doctrine is that the traditional objective standard utilized
in determining whether threatened acts actually constitute duress has been
abandoned. Once it is determined that the threatened acts are wrongful,
the only further question is whether the person complaining has been con-
strained to do what he otherwise would not have done. 7 An affirmative
finding here makes the action complete.
The rationale underlying economic duress as a cause of action , is that
the duress factor nullifies the mutual consent essential to the making of a
contract. Consequently, a judgment based on economic duress or business
compulsion ordinarily requires only the specific restitution of property
to its former possessor or the cancellation of an executory contract. The
New Jersey court in the instant case has gone further and has allowed the
threatened party to treat the contract as having been breached, has excused
2 Tannenbaum v. Francisco, 110 N.J.L. 559, 166 Atl. 105 (1933); Langer v.
Lemke, 78 N.D. 383, 49 N.W. 2d 641 (1951) ; Kroop v. Scala, 5 N.J. Misc. 89, 135
Atl. 501 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
3 Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253
(1947); Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. Rev. 237, 341 (1942); 17A
Am. Jur. Duress § 7 (1957).
4 5 Williston, Contracts § 1606 (Rev. ed. 1937).
5 Marshall v. Packard—Bell Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d 770, 236 P.2d 201 (2d Dist.
1951).
6 Hochman v. Zigler's, Inc., 139 N.J. Eq. 139, 50 A.2d 97 (1946), (Court found
duress when a tenant who was selling his business paid over half the purchase price
to his landlord upon the latter's threat not to renew the tenant's lease unless he made
such payment); Harris v. Flack, 289 Ill. 222, 124 N.E. 377 (1919), (a threat to
institute guardianship proceedings in order to procure favorable property settlements
held to constitute duress); Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404
(1950), (a threat to sue made solely for the purposes of harassment is duress); see also:
Miller v. Eisele, 111 N.J.L. 268, 168 Atl. 426 (1933); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20
N.J. 359, 120 A.2d 11 (1956); Fowler v. Mumford, 9 Terry 282, 102 A.2d 535 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1954) Restatement, Contracts, § 492(g) (1932).
7 S. P. Dunham v. Kudra, 44 N.J. Super. 565, 131 A.2d 306 (1957); Woodside
Homes, Inc_ v. Town of Morristown, 26 N.J. 529, 141 A.2d 8 (1958).
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his failure to continue performance, and has permitted him to recover
damages for the breach. The decision is reasonable in the light of the modern
trend away from the rigidity of the common law principles restricting duress
to threats of physical violence or actionable wrongs. Economic duress can
prevent performance of a contract as readily as can physical duress,
and if the latter constitutes grounds for treating the contract as breached,
there seems to be no valid reason why the former should not be treated in
the same manner. The legality of plaintiff's right to sell to whomever he
may choose can not be questioned; yet, it can be understood why the court
considered as wrongful his threat to sell to an undesirable purchaser solely
for the purpose of ruining defendant's business. The case was decided on
grounds of fundamental fairness, a concept found far more frequently at
equity than at law, but since the ultimate object of the business compulsion
doctrine seems to be the promotion of fair dealing in business contracts,
and since the handling of this case by the New Jersey court is in accord
with this objective, the decision is a sound one.
DAVID R. MELINCOFF
Corporations—Constitutional Law—State's Reserved Power to Amend
Corporate Charters.—Coyne v. Park al Tilford Distillers Corporation.'
—Plaintiffs, minority stockholders owning approximately 4 per cent of the
stock of a subsidiary seek to enjoin its merger pursuant to Delaware General
Corporation Law, Ch. 8, § 253, with its parent which owned the balance of
its stock. Plaintiffs contend that the provisions of the merger statute em-
powering the parent to pay minority dissident shareholders the value of
their stock in cash, thereby eliminating their vested interest in the merged
corporation, is unconstitutional. From a decision granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court of Delaware on appeal
affirmed. Held: The statute requiring a statement from the parent to the
shareholders of the subsidiary being merged of "the terms and conditions of
the merger, including the securities, cash, or other consideration to be issued,
paid or delivered by the parent corporation upon surrender of each share of
the merged corporation not owned by the parent corporation," 2 empowers
the parent to pay dissenting minority shareholders of the subsidiary the
value of their stock in cash. The statute as so construed is not unconstitu-
tional despite being enacted after the plaintiffs acquired their stock in the
subsidiary, even though at that time the statute permitted only conversion
of shares of the subsidiary into like shares of the parent corporation on a
merger.
Coyne represents a further chipping away of the doctrine of Keller v.
Wilson,3 and the rights of minority interests. In the Keller case an amend-
ment to the corporate charter, pursuant to statutory authorization, elimi-
1
 154 A.2d 893 (Del. Ch. 1959).
2 Del. Rev. Code 1935, § 253.
3 21 DeI. Ch. 391, 190 All. 115 (1936).
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